¿NUNCA MAíS? : Places of refuge – Coastal liability for environmental damage by Sørensen, Kristine Hasle
  
 
 
 
 
 
¿NUNCA MAíS? 
 
 
 
Places of refuge – Coastal liability for environmental damage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kandidatnr: 341 
Veileder: Thor Falkanger 
Leveringsfrist: 25. november 2004 
 
 
Til sammen 17566 ord 
 
 
29.06.2005 
 
 
  I 
Table of contents 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 1
1.1 THE PROBLEM 3 
1.2 THE OBJECT 4 
1.3 LIMITATION OF THE SUBJECT 4 
2 THE OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE A PLACE OF REFUGE 4
2.1 INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE OBLIGATION TO ASSIST VESSELS IN DISTRESS 5 
2.1.1 THE STARTING POINT: SOVEREIGNTY 5 
2.1.2 EXCEPTIONAL RIGHTS OF VESSELS IN DISTRESS 5 
2.1.3 INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND THE RIGHT TO REFUGE 6 
2.1.4 INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND THE RIGHT TO REFUGE 7 
2.1.5 CASE LAW 9 
2.1.6 THE NEW IMO GUIDELINES ON PLACES OF REFUGE 11 
2.1.7 THE EU TRAFFIC MONITORING DIRECTIVE 12 
2.2 INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE DUTY TO PROTECT AND PRESERVE THE ENVIRONMENT 13 
2.2.1 THE STARTING POINT: SOVEREIGNTY 14 
2.2.2 THE DUTY TO PREVENT HARM TO THE TERRITORY OF OTHER STATES 15 
2.2.3 THE DUTY TO PREVENT HARM BEYOND THE TERRITORY OF ANY STATE 16 
2.2.4 THE DUTY TO PREVENT HARM TO THE STATE’S OWN TERRITORY 17 
2.3 NORWEGIAN LAW 18 
2.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 20 
3 THE COASTAL STATE’S RIGHT TO COMPENSATION 21
3.1 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 21 
3.2 THE FRAMEWORK CONVENTIONS 22 
3.3 THE PROBLEM: GAPS IN THE COMPENSATION REGIME 23 
3.3.1 THE POLLUTION DAMAGE IS NOT COVERED BY ANY OF THE FOUR CONVENTIONS 23 
3.3.2 LIMITATION PROVISIONS 25 
3.3.3 EXCEPTIONS TO THE SHIPOWNER’S LIABILITY 28 
3.3.3.1 Contributory negligence 28 
  II 
3.3.3.2 Preventive measures 30 
4 COASTAL STATE LIABILITY 33
4.1 CHANNELLING OF LIABILITY 33 
4.2 LIABILITY UNDER THE POLLUTION ACT 35 
4.2.1 LIABILITY UNDER POA SECTION 55 SECOND PARAGRAPH 35 
4.2.2 PROPER PROCEDURE 37 
4.3 LIABILITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 43 
4.3.1 INTER STATE LIABILITY 43 
4.3.2 LIABILITY VIS-À-VIS INDIVIDUALS 45 
5 THE WAY AHEAD 47
6 BIBLIOGRAPHY 52
 
 
  
 1 
 
                                                
1 Introduction 
Shipping is considered an environmentally friendly way of transporting goods, because 
ships can carry large weights with relatively low consumption of energy. Accidents are, 
however, inevitable consequences of maritime activity. Carriage of harmful substances 
can in this respect represent serious risk of damage to the marine environment, as these 
substances disperse rapidly in water, making it difficult to contain the damage. It is 
therefore vital that coastal states establish measures to reduce the extent of damage 
when accidents do occur. One such measure is to bring the distressed vessel to a place 
of refuge. 
 
“Places of refuge” is the collective term for sheltered coastline areas where a ship in 
distress may seek refuge. The use of the neutral term “place of refuge” rather than the 
more commonly used “port of refuge” is intentional. Places of refuge are hence not 
restricted to ports, but may take the form of other geographical areas that in case of 
emergency can be used to provide facilities and services to ships in distress.1
 
The environmental benefits of bringing a vessel in distress to a place of refuge are 
many. Places of refuge are located in the internal waters of a state, where the waters are 
relatively tranquil compared to the open sea. This decreases the chance of deterioration 
of structural damages and increases the possibility of containing the substances that 
have already escaped from the vessel. In addition, clean up operations are more easily 
carried out in sheltered areas of the coast. The access to equipment for emergency 
unloading of the ship and damage control are normally better at a place of refuge. 
Moreover, the vessel may be repaired in order to continue its journey.  
 
 
 
1 Report of the Maritime Safety Committee, IMO doc. MSC 74/24  
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Recent events have brought considerable attention to the issue. In November 2002, the 
Bahamian registered tanker Prestige,2 carrying 77,000 tons of crude oil suffered a 
structural damage outside the coast of North Western Spain. Spanish authorities 
declined the ship’s request for refuge, and ordered her far out to sea. After several days 
of heavy weather, her condition deteriorated, and she eventually broke in two and sank 
to a depth of 3, 5 kilometres deep 270 kilometers off the coast, where she continued to 
leak. As a result, of 1900 kilometers of coastline in Spain and France was polluted, 
while oil from the vessel was also reported washed ashore in Portugal and Britain. The 
Spanish authorities’ decision not to grant refuge has been heavily criticised. It is likely 
that the damage caused could have been significantly reduced or all together avoided if 
the vessel had been granted access to a place of refuge. The title of this thesis reflects 
the slogan of the Galician community in the wake of the accident: “Nunca Maís” or 
“Never Again”. 
 
Fortunately, Norway has so far been spared accidents the size of Prestige. Yet, the risk 
of such accidents happening along the Norwegian coast is rising, as the transport of oil 
from the northern parts of Russia is increasing. Earlier, the main channels for Russian 
oil export were the Bosporus and the Baltic Sea. The heavy traffic in these areas has, 
however, resulted in transport restrictions, which have forced the Russians to look for 
alternative routes. Since it started in 2001, we have witnessed an explosion of such 
transport. In 2003, 250 ships carried 11 million tons of oil products along the 
Norwegian Coast from Russia.3 This may, however, prove to be a mere beginning. If 
Russian plans for a pipeline to Murmansk operative in 2007, are brought to completion, 
the Russian oil transport is estimated to increase to 100 million tons per year in 2015, 
implying five to six oil transports along the Norwegian Coast per day. 4  
 
 
2 Summary based on Shaw p. 333 
3 Johnsen, p. [ ] 
4 Johnsen, p. [ ]  
  
 3 
 
                                                
1.1 The problem 
Despite the fatal consequences of refusing access as illustrated by the Prestige incident, 
ships are in many cases refused access to places of refuge. Why is this? The answer lies 
in the fundamental conflict that coastal states are confronted with when facing a vessel 
in distress; while providing a safe haven for ships in distress in most cases will help 
reduce overall environmental and economic damage, the ultimate outcome is always 
uncertain and the potential consequences to the location of refuge grave. The risks 
involved in bringing a distressed vessel into a place of refuge were illustrated by the 
incident involving the Treasure5 in South Africa in 2000. This vessel, suffering from 
structural damage, was allowed to enter Table Bay to be inspected by the South African 
Maritime Safety Authority (SAMSA). As it was found to have a 170 square meters hole 
in its hull, the SAMSA ordered the vessel to unload her cargo in Cape Town or leave 
Table Bay. Yet, because of delay on part of the owner to contract salvage, she 
subsequently sank under tow, just 10 kilometres off the coast. As a consequence, 1400 
tons of crude oil from the ship’s bunkers was spilt, causing extensive damage to the 
marine environment in the area, and also leading to a stricter South African attitude on 
access to its territorial waters. 
 
Despite the risks involved, the decision to grant refuge will in many cases prove to be 
the best environmental option. This is illustrated by the Sea Empress6 casualty. The 
vessel, which was laden with 130,000 tons of crude oil, ran aground off the port of 
Milford Haven in the United Kingdom in February 1996. A large quantity of oil was 
spilt in order to lighten the vessel and avoid sinking, but once refloated, the ship was 
brought into port, where the remaining cargo was successfully unloaded. 
 
The fundamental problem relating to places of refuge is that whilst the environmental 
benefits of granting refuge are widely recognised, coastal states are not particularly keen 
to take responsibility for granting them. This practice has been named the “not in my 
backyard” syndrome. For obvious reasons, this practice is unfortunate. This dissertation 
 
 
5 Summary based on Maddern p. 104  
6 Summary based on Shaw, p. 334 
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deals with some of the legal issues that can be highlighted in this respect, most notably 
the rights and obligations of the parties involved and the liability issues that arise from a 
place of refuge situation. 
1.2 The object  
The object of this dissertation is twofold. Chapter 2 seeks to outline the legal status 
coastal states in a place of refuge situation, by examining, first, whether coastal states in 
general can be said to have a duty under international law to accommodate ships in 
distress at a place of refuge. Secondly, the same question will be examined with respect 
to Norwegian law. Chapters 3 and 4 are concerned with the liability and compensation 
issues that arise once the ship has been granted or refused access to a place of refuge. 
Chapter 5 seeks to present solutions to the problems identified in the foregoing chapters. 
1.3 Limitation of the subject 
Due to the restricted scope of this dissertation, it is necessary to limit the subject in a 
number of respects. Firstly, the discussion is restricted to places of refuge in the internal 
waters of a state.7 Secondly, I will only consider the right of entry to a place of refuge 
of vessels that represent an environmental risk to the coastal state. Situations where 
human life is in danger fall outside the scope of this thesis.  
2 The obligation to provide a place of refuge 
There are two main grounds on which the duty to provide a place of refuge can be 
based. The obligation to provide refuge may first of all arise from a distress situation. 
Secondly, the coastal state may be obliged to provide refuge on the basis of its 
environmental commitments.  
 
 
7 Theoretically, one could imagine places of refuge in the territorial sea. 
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2.1 International law: The obligation to assist vessels in distress 
2.1.1 The starting point: Sovereignty 
Places of refuge located in the internal waters of a state are subject to the full 
sovereignty of the coastal state. This principle of international customary law is codified 
in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) article 2 (1), which 
reads: “The sovereignty of a coastal state extends, beyond its land territory and internal 
waters, and, in the case of an archipelagic state, its archipelagic waters, to the adjacent 
belt of sea, described as the territorial sea.” 
 
By virtue of their sovereignty, states are only subject to obligations by way of consent 
or through the emergence of customary law, and have exclusive right to exercise control 
and jurisdiction. This includes the right to regulate access to its internal waters, cf. the 
Nicaragua case of International Court of Justice, where it was held that “by virtue of its 
sovereignty [..] the coastal state may regulate access to its ports”.8  
2.1.2 Exceptional rights of vessels in distress 
Under international law, the right of a coastal state to regulate access to its internal 
waters is subject to a single exception, namely the right of vessels in distress to seek 
refuge.9 The right to seek refuge is an ancient principle of international customary law10 
rooted in humanitarian concerns, 11 forming part of a series of exceptional rights granted 
to vessels in distress. Other rights arising from the distress situation include the right of 
vessels in distress to stop and anchor in the territorial sea12 and the exemption from 
charges in port.13 Given that the right of entry in distress is rooted in humanitarian 
 
 
8 Nicaragua v. United States 
9 Churchill, p. 63, Chirop, p. 212-216, Ruud I, p. 126, Blanco-Bazan, p. 2, Hooydonk II, p. 126-130  
10 Chirop, p. 207 
11 Hydeman, p. 157, Chirop, p. 216 
12 UNCLOS Article 18 (2) 
13 Hooydonk II, p. 133 
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concerns, it is uncertain whether the principle can be extended further than to the 
protection of human life, and must therefore be given further consideration.14  
2.1.3 International conventions and the right to refuge 
The rights and obligations of a coastal state when faced with a request for refuge are not 
identified in any current international convention. The only provision of international 
conventional law that contains a direct reference to the place of refuge situation is 
article 11 of the Salvage Convention of 1989, under the heading “Cooperation of 
contracting States”: 
 
“A State Party shall, whenever regulating or deciding upon matters relating to salvage 
operations such as admittance to ports of vessels in distress or the provision of 
facilities to salvors, take into account the need for co-operation between salvors, other 
interested parties and public authorities in order to ensure the efficient and successful 
performance of salvage operations for the purpose of saving life or property in danger as 
well as preventing damage to the environment in general” (emphasis added). 
 
The question remains, however, whether article 11 can serve as a legal basis for an 
obligation to admit ships in distress to a place of refuge. The preparatory works reveal 
that some delegations favoured “that there should be a clearly spelled out obligation for 
states to admit vessels in distress into their ports.”15 Among those who were against it, 
some argued that it was unfortunate to include such a “public law rule” in a private law 
convention, while others felt that such an obligation would undermine the interests of 
coastal states. As a result, one landed on the rather vague formulation in article 11. The 
preparatory works and the particular rules of interpretation that apply to international 
law speak in favour of narrow interpretation of the provision, whereby the coastal state 
hence has a general duty to cooperate with salvors, but no absolute obligation to grant 
access as such.16 One may argue that the duty to cooperate under Article 11 should be 
 
 
14 Churchill, p. 63 
15 IMO doc. LEG 83/13/3 
16 Chirop, p. 218-220. 
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interpreted as a duty to facilitate entry to places of refuge whenever reasonably possible, 
as successful salvage in many cases will depend on the coastal state’s granting of a 
place of refuge.   
 
State practice since the 1970s has, however, gone in favour of restricting admittance of 
vessels in distress where human life is not in danger.17 This development can be seen a 
reaction to an altered risk picture, justified in the principle of protection whereby a state 
has the right to act when its security is threatened.  18  Indeed, both public awareness of 
the risks involved in bringing a casualty vessel into a place of refuge and the risk itself 
have increased, as developments since the 50-60s has allowed for larger ships and 
potentially more hazardous cargos to travel seas, leading to further reluctance to grant 
coastal refuge to vessels in distress. 
2.1.4 International customary law and the right to refuge 
The current status of the right to seek refuge under international customary law is 
equally uncertain. This is reflected in a recent report on Places of Refuge submitted by 
Comite Maritime International19 (CMI) to the International Maritime Organisation’s20 
(IMO) Legal Committee. The report is based on a survey among the National Maritime 
Law Associations of the IMO member states. The report states that a large number of 
delegations supported the view that “The right, according to international customary 
law, for a vessel in distress to be granted a place of refuge no longer appears to be 
recognised by many states as an absolute right and has become clouded.”21 
 
 
17 Chirop, p. 215 
18 Chirop, p. 216 
19 CMI is a non-governmental organisation that works to promote unification of maritime law. CMI has 
established a working group on Places of Refuge under the chairmanship of Stuart Hetherington, which 
has conducted a survey among its national member associations. The information obtained in this survey 
formed basis for the drafting of guidelines on Places of Refuge within the IMO. 
20 The IMO is an inter-governmental organisation within the United Nations umbrella that was 
established by the IMO Convention in 1958. 
21 IMO doc. LEG 89/7 
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Customary law is based on general practice that among states is recognised as law.22 
When an alleged right no longer conforms to state practice, and is not recognised by 
states as law, it ceases to be customary law. We can therefore establish that vessels in 
distress no longer enjoy an absolute right of entry. Indeed, the recent incident involving 
the Norwegian vessel Tampa has shown that the right of entry in distress may not even 
be absolute in cases where human life is in danger.23
 
On the other hand, there is little support for an absolute right to refuse entry. As stated 
above, a state may invoke the customary law principle of protection when its security is 
threatened. The notion of security was originally reserved protection of territorial 
sovereignty, but has gradually developed to include protection of a state’s 
environmental interests. 24 The principle of protection is evident in the Intervention 
Convention, which under given circumstances may provide a basis for refusing access 
to internal waters. Article 1 (1) states that the coastal state may take “Such measures on 
the high seas as may be necessary to prevent, mitigate or eliminate grave and 
imminent danger to their coastline or related interests from pollution or the threat of 
pollution of the sea by oil, following upon a marine casualty or acts related to such 
casualty, which may reasonably be expected to result in major harmful 
consequences” (emphasis added). As evident from this quote, the right to intervene is 
subject to conditions. 
 
In order to lawfully refuse access on the basis of the principle of protection, the states 
vital interests must be at stake. The admittance of the vessel must hence constitute an 
actual and serious threat to the security of the coastal state. Almost any ship may pose a 
potential threat to the environmental interests of states, but access cannot be denied such 
vessel on the basis of the principle of protection. 25 Moreover, the coastal state cannot 
invoke the principle of protection were it willing to grant entry subject to financial 
 
 
22 Statute of the International Court of Justice article 38 (1) b) 
23 The MV Tampa was refused entry by Australian authorities following its rescue of a group of Afghan 
refugees from a shipwreck in 2001. For further reading, see Røsæg, p. 43-82 
24 Chirop, p. 217 
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guarantees, as mere economic interests are not protected under the principle of 
protection.26  
 
This is illustrated by article 9 of the Salvage Convention, which recognises the coastal 
state’s right to protection, but only subject to conditions: “Nothing in this Convention 
shall affect the right of the coastal State concerned to take measures in accordance with 
generally recognised principles of international law to protect its coastline or related 
interests from pollution or the threat of pollution following upon a maritime casualty or 
acts relating to such a casualty which may reasonably be expected to result in major 
harmful consequences, including the right of a coastal state to give directions in 
relation to salvage operations” (emphasis added).  
2.1.5 Case law 
That the right to refuse access is subject to conditions was also expressed in a decision 
by the Irish High Court of Admiralty when the principle of protection was invoked by 
the coastal state. The case concerned the vessel Toledo, which had been refused access 
to Dutch internal waters. The decision was challenged by the shipowner. The tribunal 
stated that “Where in a particular case, such as the Toledo, there was no risk to life as 
the crew had abandoned the casualty before a request for refuge had been made, it 
seems to me that there can be no doubt that the coastal state, in the interest of defending 
its own interests and those of its citizens, may lawfully refuse refuge to such a casualty 
if there are reasonable grounds for believing that there is a significant risk of 
substantial harm to the state or its citizens if the casualty is given refuge and that 
such harm is potentially greater than that which would result if the vessel in 
distress and/or her cargo was lost through refusal of shelter in the waters of the 
coastal state” 27 (emphasis added).  
 
 
 
25 Hooydonk II, p. 127-128, Hydeman, p. 157-158 
26 Hooydonk I, p. 425 
27 ACT Shipping (OTE) Ltd. v. Minister for the Marine 
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A similar approach is evident in a decision by the Dutch Judicial Division of the 
Council of state. The case concerned the vessel Long Lin,28  which collided outside the 
coast of the Netherlands in March 1992, and was severely damaged. The vessel 
requested the authorities’ permission to enter Dutch territorial waters, but this was only 
granted subject to an unconditional financial guarantee from the shipowner. The ship’s 
P&I Club agreed to issue the guarantee provided that they would retain their right to 
limit liability. This was not accepted by the authorities, which then refused to grant 
entry. The decision of the authorities was challenged by the shipowner and the Dutch 
repair yard that had lost the repair order as a consequence of the refusal. The court 
stated that international law does not permit the authorities of a coastal state to prevent a 
vessel in distress from seeking refuge in port or near the coast. In such a case the 
decision of whether or not to grant entry should weigh the gravity of the ship’s situation 
against the threat the ship constitutes to the coastal state.29  
 
The approach of the court here reflects a balance of interest theory, in which the 
principle stakes may be summed up as follows: The right of entry traditionally 
recognises the involuntariness of the distress situation, and that certain exceptional 
rights arise from the emergency situation. The right to seek refuge promotes the safety 
of the ship and its crew, and will in many cases reduce the extent of the damage, by 
making possible reparations and emergency unloading of the cargo. The right to entry in 
distress further serves the economic interests of the shipping industry, because it 
reduces the chance of loss of the ship and its cargo. Hence it also promotes economic 
predictability that in turn serves more global interests, especially if one takes into 
account the importance of shipping as a means of transport that causes relatively less 
operational pollution compared to land based transport. In order to encourage the 
carriage of goods by sea, one must make sure that the costs related to it can be kept at as 
low a level as possible. Finally but not least, recent incidents involving casualty ships 
have shown that granting refuge may also serve environmental interests, as accidental 
pollution from vessel is better contained if refuge is granted. 
 
 
28 Based on English summary in NILOS Newsletter, No. 13 (1995)  
29 This approach is supported by Churchill, p. 60-63, Blanco-Bazan p. 3 and Hydeman p. 157-158 
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On the other hand, the right of protection recognises that granting refuge may conflict 
with the environmental interests of the coastal state. Such interests include the 
protection local nature and wildlife. For vessels carrying toxic or other harmful 
substances admittance may conflict with the coastal state’s public health and safety 
interests. Reluctance to grant refuge may also be rooted in political concerns, as a 
decision to grant entry is likely to produce discontent in the communities surrounding a 
place of refuge. As much as one is willing to recognise the ultimate environmental 
benefits of granting refuge, it may be difficult to accept that local communities are 
sacrificed to this effect. Finally, economic concerns also play a role. Economic activities 
such as fishing and shellfish harvesting, tourism and other means of livelihood in 
coastal areas may be threatened, or willingness to admit vessels may depend on the 
possibility of recovering the state’s expenses when pollution does occur. 
2.1.6 The new IMO guidelines on places of refuge 
The balance of interest theory is reflected in the IMO guidelines on Places of refuge for 
ships in need of assistance (IMO guidelines), which were adopted at the IMO Assembly 
in November 2003.30 The guidelines recognise that “When a ship has suffered an 
incident, the best way of preventing damage or pollution from its progressive 
deterioration would be to lighten its cargo and bunkers; and to repair the damage. Such 
an operation is best carried out in a place of refuge.”31 However, the guidelines go on to 
recognise the environmental and economic risks involved for the coastal state, and the 
problem of resistance from local authorities in the area.32 On this basis, the guidelines 
establish that “granting access to a place of refuge could involve a political decision that 
can only be taken on a case-by-case basis with due consideration given to the balance 
between the advantage for the affected ship and the environment resulting from the 
bringing the ship into a place of refuge and the risk to the environment resulting from 
that ship being near the coast.”33
 
 
30 Resolution A.949(23) 
31 IMO guidelines section 1.3 
32 IMO guidelines section 1.4 
33 IMO guidelines section 1.7 
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The guidelines on Places of Refuge are not legally binding, but are expected to have 
considerable effect in setting a standard for proper procedure in place of refuge 
situations. The political sensitivity of this issue was illustrated in the drafting of the 
guidelines in April 2003, during which Spain, at the time still recovering from the 
Prestige accident, sought to amend the guidelines in various ways.34 The Spanish 
delegation among other wanted to remove one of the most critical provisions of the 
guidelines, which states: “When permission to access a place of refuge is requested, 
there is no obligation for the coastal state to grant it, but the coastal state should weigh 
all the factors and risks in a balanced manner and give shelter whenever reasonably 
possible.”35
 
The overall effect of the guidelines remains to be seen. Soft law instruments may, 
however, serve as an expression of legal status quo, which may develop to become part 
of international customary law.36 One may read the IMO guidelines as expressing what 
the majority of states consider opinio juris on the subject, namely that the decision 
should be taken by weighing the interests of the vessel, the coastal state and the 
environment.  
2.1.7 The EU Traffic Monitoring Directive 
The balance of interest approach is also apparent in the EU Traffic Monitoring Directive 
through its reference to the IMO guidelines.37 The directive is part of the Erika II 
package, named after the Erika38 accident of December 1999, which revealed serious 
gaps in European maritime safety regulation. This oil tanker loaded with 31.000 tons of 
heavy fuel oil suffered distress outside the coast of France, and requested refuge in the 
port of Saint-Nazaire. The request was declined, whereupon the vessel was ordered out 
 
 
34 The account of the incident is based on Shaw, p. 336 
35 IMO guidelines section  3.12 
36 Ruud II, p. 25-26 
37 Directive 59/2002 
38 Summary based on information from IOPC Fund web page, available at 
http://www.iopcfund.org/erika.htm 
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on the high sea, where it broke in two and sank, causing extensive damage to the coast 
of France.  
 
The Traffic Monitoring Directive places upon the member states an obligation to make 
plans for accommodation of distressed vessels, including designation of places of 
refuge: “Member states, having consulted the parties concerned, shall draw up, taking 
into account relevant guidelines by IMO, plans to accommodate, in the waters under 
their jurisdiction, ships in distress. Such plans shall contain the necessary arrangements 
and procedures taking into account operational and environmental constrains, to ensure 
that ships in distress may immediately go to a place of refuge subject to the 
authorization by the competent authority. Where the member states consider it 
necessary and feasible, the plans must contain arrangements for the provision of 
adequate means and facilities for assistance, salvage and pollution response. Plans for 
accommodating ships shall be made available upon demand. Member states shall 
inform the Commission by 5 February 2004 of the measures taken in application of the 
first paragraph.”39
 
The directive was adopted by the EEA committee on 31 January 2004, making 
Norwegian Authorities obliged to transpose the directive into Norwegian law, in 
accordance with the EEA agreement. As a consequence of the directive, the Norwegian 
Coastal Directorate has established a procedure for decision-making, that aims at 
bringing distressed vessels into places of refuge and even beach them when necessary, 
based on the IMO guidelines. This procedure will be discussed further below.  
2.2 International law: The duty to protect and preserve the environment 
The 20th century saw significant developments with regard to international 
environmental law, and it is today legitimate to ask whether the admission or refusal of 
a vessel in distress can be said to constitute a breach of the environmental obligations of 
states under international law.   
 
 
 
39 This deadline was postponed to 1 July 2004, but Norway complied with the original deadline. 
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Neither of the provisions that will be discussed in the following deals directly with the 
coastal state’s duty to provide refuge. The incidents involving the Erika and the 
Prestige have shown, however, that under given circumstances the environmental 
obligations of coastal states cannot be fulfilled without offering a place of refuge. The 
following chapter gives a presentation of the environmental duties that may serve as 
legal basis for an obligation to grant refuge.  
2.2.1 The starting point: Sovereignty 
A traditional starting point of international law is that states are free to decide how to 
make use of their own territory in recognition of the principle of sovereignty.40 This is 
reflected in UNCLOS Article 193, which establishes that: “states have the sovereign 
right to exploit their natural resources pursuant to their environmental policies and in 
accordance with their duty to protect and preserve the marine environment.” The 
provision states that the sovereignty of states is restricted by the duty to protect and 
preserve the marine environment as stated in UNCLOS article 192. This provision does 
not give much guidance with regard to the more precise content of this duty. A more 
detailed description of the obligation is, however, provided in the subsequent 
provisions. 
 
Article 194 (1) requires states to take all necessary measures to protect and preserve the 
marine environment in general, by “using for this purpose the best practical means at 
their disposal and in accordance with their capabilities.” This is in recognition of the 
common but differentiated responsibility for preserving the environment, with particular 
regard to the scarce resources of developing countries.41 A characteristic feature of a 
place of refuge situation is that it may involve several coastal states that are all reluctant 
to take responsibility of the distressed vessel. An example of a so called “maritime 
leper” situation is provided by the case of Castor42. This 30,000 ton tanker, fully laden 
with gasoline, suffered structural damage in the Mediterranean in December 2000. For 
 
 
40 Ruud I, p. 82 
41 Birnie, p. 352 
42 Summary based on Shaw, p. 332-333 
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the purpose of lightening the vessel of its cargo, requests to allow her into a place of 
refuge were made. Several states refused to grant refuge, amongst which Algeria, 
Gibraltar, Greece, Malta, Morocco, Spain and Tunisia. After being towed around the 
Mediterranean for 40 days, the cargo was finally transferred successfully to another 
tanker at sea. Although it is always difficult to predict what the consequences of taking 
the vessel into a place of refuge would have been, the risks involved in letting a damage 
tanker drift around in what was at times heavy weather for 40 days were presumably 
greater. In accordance with UNCLOS, all states have an obligation to prevent damage to 
the environment in general. But the content of the duty will vary in recognition of the 
different resources states have at their disposal. In the Castor case one could perhaps 
ague that the responsibility for taking in the vessel should rest with the state or states 
that have at their disposal the best resources for handling a place of refuge situation. 
2.2.2 The duty to prevent harm to the territory of other states 
The principle of sovereignty may also be in strong conflict with the right of other states 
when it comes to environmental questions, as effects of environmental damages are 
seldom confined to a specific area. Each state’s territory makes part of an indivisible 
system in which actions of one state will have important spillover effects on others. 
Consequently, the obligation to prevent environmental harm to other states is a principal 
tenet of international environmental law.43  
 
The duty to prevent harm to other states’ territory was first formulated in the famous quote from the Trail 
Smelter arbitration of 1941, that reads as follows: “The Tribunal finds that under the principles of 
international law, as well as the law of the United states, no state has the right to use or permit the use of 
its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties 
or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and 
convincing evidence.”44  
 
The obligation not to cause harm to the territory of other states is now recognised as a 
principle of international customary law. The principle is codified in UNCLOS article 
 
 
43 Smith, p. 72 
44 United States v. Canada  
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194 (2): “states shall take all measures necessary to ensure that activities under their 
jurisdiction or control are so conducted as not to cause damage by pollution to other 
states and their environment, and that pollution arising from incidents or activities under 
their jurisdiction or control does not spread beyond the areas where they exercise 
sovereign rights in accordance with this Convention.”  
 
Recent events have shown that the refusal to provide refuge may conflict with the duty 
to prevent harm to other states’ territory. This is exemplified by the Prestige accident, 
where damage was caused to the coasts of France, Portugal and England as well as 
Spain after refuge was denied by the Spanish government. Yet, harm to other states 
could also arise from the admittance of a vessel to a place of refuge that proves 
unsuitable. When faced with a casualty vessel, part of the decision as to whether to 
grant a place of refuge should therefore consist in an assessment of the potential harm to 
other states that refusing or granting a place of refuge may result in. 
2.2.3 The duty to prevent harm beyond the territory of any state 
Refusal to grant entry to a place of refuge may also cause harm beyond the territory 
beyond any state, e.g. the high seas. The starting point is that the high seas are free, 
meaning that the high seas are open to all states. This principle of international 
customary law was first codified in the High Seas Convention of 1958. Today, the 
principle is given expression in UNCLOS article 87(1), which establishes the freedom 
of navigation, overflight, fishing etc.  
 
Yet, article 87 (2) also establishes that this freedom must be exercised “with due regard 
for the interests of other states in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas”. It is 
clear that when the refuge question arises, ordering the vessel out on the high seas may 
result in damage to fish and other resources of the sea and thus conflict with the 
freedoms of other states, as well as represent an obstacle to the freedom of navigation of 
other ships. 
 
One might therefore ask if the obligation to protect and preserve the environment as 
states in UNCLOS article 194 (2) may serve as a legal basis for an obligation to prevent 
harm to the area beyond any state’s territory. Such obligation receives confirmation by 
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Principle 21 of the Stockholm declaration of 1972, which reads “states have…the 
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause 
damage to the environment of other states or of the areas beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction” (emphasis added). Although the declaration is not legally 
binding, it signals an expansion of the environmental obligation to prevent harm to the 
territory of other states as established in the Trail Smelter arbitration.45
 
Both the duty to prevent harm to other states’ territory and the high seas is further 
elaborated in UNCLOS Article 195, which prescribes how states should act to fulfil 
their environmental obligations. “In taking measures to prevent, reduce and control 
pollution of the marine environment, states shall act so as not to transfer, directly or 
indirectly, damage or hazards from one area to another or transform one type of 
pollution into another.” In a place of refuge context, this provision is perhaps the most 
pertinent, because these decisions inevitably consider transfer of damage. In case of 
refusal, damage may be transferred to a neighbouring state or to the high seas. But also 
the decision to grant refuge may constitute an act that indirectly transfers damage from 
the high sea to the coastal state and its surroundings. 
2.2.4 The duty to prevent harm to the state’s own territory 
The coastal state’s sovereign right to decide how to make use of its territory is thus 
primarily restricted by the obligation to prevent harm to the territory of other states and 
the area beyond the territory of any state. But states also have a duty to prevent harm to 
its own territory were failure to do so results in violation of human rights.  A possible 
basis for such duty is the European Convention on Human Rights (EHRC). The 
convention does not contain any provision dealing with the protection of environmental 
interests, but the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) established that serious 
pollution may constitute a breach of article 8 concerning the right to a home and family 
life in the case of Lopez Ostra v. Spain.46 The case concerned the authorities’ failure to 
act in accordance with its supervisory powers to prevent and control pollution, which 
 
 
45 Birnie, p. 352, Ruud I, p. 86 
46 Lopez Ostra v. Spain 
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was considered a violation of article 8. The court prescribed that it was the duty of the 
state to strike a fair balance between the interests of the individual and that of the 
community as a whole. In a place of refuge context, failure to strike balance may arise 
where the rights of individuals who live in immediate proximity of the place of refuge 
are sacrificed to avoid damage to the coastal community as a whole. Where pollution 
results from such granting of a place of refuge, this may firstly conflict with the right to 
a home and private life. Moreover, if the vessel is leaking poisonous or otherwise 
dangerous substances, this may conflict with the right to health and life. 
 
In many cases, harm to the state’s own territory will result regardless of whether refuge 
is granted or not. An example of the contrary is provided by the incident involving 
Khark 5.47 This tanker suffered an explosion north of the Canary Islands in December 
1989, and was subsequently denied access to a place of refuge by the Moroccan and 
Spanish authorities. Despite the fact that more than 85,000 tons of oil escaped, little or 
none reached shore, as what was not recovered dissolved before it reached shore. The 
case being exemplary, one must, however, not overestimate environmental benefits of 
refusing refuge. The successful dissolving of large quantities of oil in water is 
dependent on many factors, among them distance from the coast, wind and weather 
conditions, water temperature etc. In the specific case of Norway, one may for instance 
predict that relatively low water temperature would hinder an effective dissolution of 
spilled oil. 
2.3 Norwegian Law  
As one of very few countries, Norway has enacted legislation concerning the right of 
vessels to enter Norwegian internal waters. Regulation of 24 December 1994 No. 1130 
on the entry into and passage through Norwegian Territorial Waters in peacetime of 
foreign, non-military vessels section 14 second paragraph reads as follows: “Foreign, 
non-military vessels which are obliged to seek a port of refuge for the reasons specified 
in section 10, second paragraph [force majeure or distress or for the purpose of 
rendering assistance to persons, ships or aircraft which are in danger of distress], may 
 
 
47 USGN case history 
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enter Norwegian internal waters without prior written application.” This is, however, 
modified by section 12, second paragraph, which states that “Foreign non-military 
vessels may, when particular circumstances so require, be refused entry to Norwegian 
internal waters.” Under Norwegian law, the starting point with regard to vessels in 
distress is thus that they have right to enter internal waters. Where a vessel represents a 
serious risk of pollution, this may, however, constitute a particular circumstance on the 
basis of which access may be lawfully denied.  
 
So being, when will then a vessel granted refuge under Norwegian law? Admittance of 
vessels to places of refuge is part of the national emergency response to pollution, 
responsibility of which was transferred from the Ministry of the Environment to the 
Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs on 1 January 2003.48  The authority to exercise 
the responsibility is placed with the Norwegian Coastal Administration’s Department 
for Emergency Response (DER).49 The department has, in accordance with article 20 of 
the Traffic Monitoring Directive, identified places of refuge along the coast. It has also 
established a Procedure for Places of Refuge, based on the IMO guidelines on Places of 
Refuge. The DER procedure applies to situations in which vessels threaten the safety at 
sea or represent a risk of damage to the environment.50 It establishes that a place of 
refuge shall be used where this offers a net safety and environmental profit.51 A net 
safety and environmental profit exists where the expected total damages as a result of 
refusal exceed the expected total damages as a result of permission.52 In reaching the 
decision, the DER shall evaluate different factors and risks in cooperation with the 
parties involved in the place of refuge situation.53 The DER procedure holds that a 
decision to grant or refuse refuge shall be reached by the DER director after a joint 
assessment of the different factors.54 
 
 
48 Regulation to the Pollution Act of 20 December 2002 no. 1629 
49 Act relating to harbours and fairways of 8 June 1984 no. 51 section 4 
50 DER procedure section 1 first paragraph 
51 DER procedure section 6 first paragraph 
52 Velde, p. 489 
53 The factors are set out in appendix 3 to the DER procedure. 
54 Procedure section 7.1 
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2.4 Concluding remarks 
The discussion in this chapter has revealed that the legal position of coastal states in 
place of refuge situation is in no way unambiguous. The right of vessels in distress is no 
longer recognised as an absolute right under international customary law. On the other 
hand, there is little support for an absolute right of refusal. The emerging theory is that 
the decision on whether or not to grant refuge should be taken on a case by case basis, 
in which the different interests involved are weighed and given due consideration. The 
balance of interest theory is reflected in the IMO guidelines, which provide a standard 
for proper procedure against which the actual conduct of the coastal state can be 
assessed. The guidelines are not legally binding, but may be taken to express opinio 
juris on the subject. One could ask if the reference to the IMO guidelines in the Traffic 
Monitoring Directive make them more than soft law in the EEA Party states.55 At any 
rate, there is reason to expect that the guidelines will play an important role in assessing 
the situation in the wake of an admission or refusal that results in environmental 
damage within the European Union and elsewhere. In Norway this standard has been 
implemented in an administrative procedure for decision-making when faced with a 
request for refuge, which establishes that refuge shall be granted when this offers a net 
safety and environmental profit. As we shall see in chapter 4, this standard will have 
implication for the question of coastal state liability under Norwegian law.  
 
Another question that has been raised is whether the environmental obligations of a 
coastal state may oblige it to grant or refuse access. The discussion has revealed that, 
under given circumstances, coastal states cannot refuse access without violating its 
environmental obligations under international law. On the other hand, admission of a 
vessel may also be an infringement of such obligations. International environmental law 
does hence not provide a clear and predictable basis for establishing when the state may 
lawfully grant or refuse entry.  
 
The conclusion must be that no general rule as to when coastal states are obliged to 
grant refuge can be established, yet that the decision to grant or refuse entry may 
 
 
55 Ringbom, p. 161 
  
 21 
 
                                                
conflict with rules of proper procedure and the environmental obligations of states. The 
following chapters look at the extent to which this exposes the coastal state financially. 
3 The coastal state’s right to compensation 
3.1 Introductory remarks 
Recent decades have witnessed increased focus on the protection and preservation of the 
marine environment which has resulted in a new generation of IMO conventions on 
liability and compensation damage caused by pollution from vessels (the framework 
conventions). Traditionally, maritime claims have been subject to limitations that lack 
counterparts in land based activity. The right to limitation of maritime claims is based 
on the London Convention of 1976 (LLMC Convention). A Protocol to the convention 
was signed in 1996. Both are incorporated into Norwegian Law in chapter 9 of the 
Norwegian Maritime Code (NMC). 56 The right to limit liability is a recognition of the 
considerable risk involved in shipping, making limitation of liability necessary to 
promote a certain degree of economic predictability. It is, however, plausible that the 
right to limit liability has no counterpart outside maritime law, which may indicate that 
its existence today is stronger rooted in tradition than reason.57
 
Systems that ensure adequate compensation in the event of pollution are vital to coastal 
states faced with vessels in distress. Were liability regimes secure that coastal states are 
adequately compensated, they will be less reluctant to admit a distressed vessel.  
 
When the issue of places of refuge was first raised in the IMO in 2001, the focus of the 
work was to consider the legal issues relating to the establishment of places of refuge.58 
This work did, however, reveal several unanswered questions relating to liability and 
 
 
56 The Norwegian Maritime Code of 24 June 1994 no. 39  
57 Falkanger I, p. 184-185 
58 IMO doc. LEG 83/13/3 
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compensation.59 This chapter considers the legal and financial exposure of coastal states 
in the role of claimant in refuge situation where a vessel poses an environmental threat. 
3.2 The framework conventions 
Liability for pollution caused by oil spills from tankers is regulated by the Civil 
Liability Convention (CLC Convention),  which was adopted as a direct consequence of 
the Torrey Canyon60 disaster in 1967. This tanker laden with 120.000 tons of crude oil 
ran aground off the coast of south-west England. The oil leaked from the ship, causing 
severe damage to the coasts of England and France. The total losses far exceeded the 
compensation available under the then applicable Brussels Limitation Convention of 
1957, which made evident the need for a new liability regime for oil pollution from 
tankers.    
 
The CLC Convention imposes strict liability on the registered owner of the vessel. At 
the time of its adoption in 1969, this represented a dramatic departure from the 
traditional principle of fault liability in maritime law. It soon became clear that the 
limitation figures under the CLC Convention provided inadequate compensation in 
cases of serious oil pollution. This led to the adoption of the Fund Convention in 1971, 
under which an international fund (the IOPC Fund)61 financed by the cargo interests 
was established. The purposes of the Fund Convention are to secure additional 
compensation where the compensation under the Civil Liability Convention is 
inadequate and to relieve the shipowner of some of the financial burden connected with 
oil spill damage. The Fund will pay compensation even when the shipowner is 
uninsured or otherwise incapable of meeting his financial obligations. The conventions 
are incorporated into Norwegian law by chapter 10 in the NMC. 
  
In 1996, the IMO adopted the HNS Convention that will provide compensation for 
victims of accident involving hazardous and noxious substances. The convention is 
 
 
59 IMO doc. LEG 87/17 
60 Summary based on Falkanger I, p. 204 
61 International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund 
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based on the CLC and Fund regimes, but goes further in that it covers not only pollution 
damage but also damage connected to fire and explosion, including loss of life and 
personal injury as well as damage to property. The latest IMO Convention on liability 
for environmental damage is the Bunkers Convention. The HNS and Bunkers are still 
awaiting ratification by the required number of states to come into force.  
3.3 The problem: Gaps in the compensation regime 
Despite these conventions, problems related to gaps in the compensation regime do 
however persist. If some of these will be removed by the entry into force of the HNS 
and Bunkers conventions, others will be offered no foreseeable remedy. This chapter 
seeks to identify and explain these gaps. 
3.3.1 The pollution damage is not covered by any of the four conventions 
One of the problems a coastal state may be faced with in a place of refuge situation is 
that the damage incurred is not covered by any of the four framework conventions. The 
most evident gap relates to damage caused by bunker oil and hazardous and noxious 
substances, as the Bunker Oil and HNS Conventions have not yet entered into force.  
 
The HNS Convention will enter into force 18 months after ratification by “at least 12 
states, including 4 states each with no less than 2 million units of gross tonnage”62 
providing that the persons who are obliged to contribute to the HNS Fund in these states 
“have received during the preceding calendar year a total quantity of at least 40 million 
tons of cargo contributing to the general account.”63  The current number of ratifications 
is six.64
 
While the HNS Convention remains unratified, compensation for pollution damage 
caused by ships carrying such substances is regulated by the Norwegian Pollution Act 
(POA).65 Section 53 fourth paragraph establishes that POA chapter 8 on liability for 
 
 
62 HNS Convention article 46 (1) a) 
63 HNS Convention article 46 (1) b) 
64 Angola, Morocco, Russian Federation, Samoa, Slovenia and Tonga (as at 30 August 2004) 
65 Act relating to protection against pollution and relating to waste of 13 March 1981 no. 6 
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pollution damage applies to pollution from ships insofar as the liability is not 
specifically regulated by other legislation, cf. POA section 53 first paragraph. The NMC 
does not regulate liability for pollution from other sources than oil; hence the rules in 
POA chapter 8 apply. POA section 55 first paragraph establishes strict liability on the 
operator of the polluting activity. When it comes to pollution from ships this will 
normally be the shipowner.66
 
Liability under POA chapter 8 is unlimited. Maritime claims are, however, subject to 
the rules in NMC Chapter 9.67 The shipowner is therefore entitled to limit his liability 
accordingly. The liability limits depend on whether the applicable convention is the 
1976 LLMC Convention or the 1996 Protocol. NMC section 170 establishes that the 
1996 Protocol applies unless the party that invokes the right to limit liability has its 
main office or is resident of a foreign state that has ratified the 1976 LLMC Convention 
but not the 1996 Protocol. Under the 1976 Convention the limit for damage other than 
personal injury is 167.000 Special Drawing Rights68 (SDR), which is raised according 
to the gross tonnage of the vessel. The limitation amount for a vessel with a gross 
tonnage of 50.000 tons is for example approximately 7, 5 million SDR, which equals 
about 9 million euros. Under the 1996 Protocol, the limitation amount for a vessel of the 
same size is approximately 15 million SDR, which equals about 18 million euros. Under 
the HNS Convention, a ship of 50.000 tons gross tonnage will have a limitation amount 
of 82 million SDR, or about 96 million euros. It seems that the differences between 
status quo and the limits under the dormant convention speak for themselves with 
regard to the insufficiency of the compensation under the LLMC Convention. 
 
The Bunkers Convention will enter into force one year after the convention has been 
ratified by “eighteen states, including five states each with ships whose combined gross 
 
 
66 Falkanger I, p. 217 
67 POA section 53 first paragraph 
68 Special Drawing Rights are an international value used to provide a regular comparative evaluation by 
the International Monetary Fund of the currency of member nations, cf. Tetley 
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tonnage is not less than 1 million”.69 So far, five states have ratified the Bunker Oil 
Convention.70 While the convention is not in force the liability for such oil spills is 
regulated by NMC section 208, which imposes strict liability on the shipowner for such 
damage, cf. NMC section 191. The liability is, however, subject to limitation in 
accordance with NMC chapter 9.71 The entry into force of Bunkers Convention will not 
lead to a change in this respect, seeing that the limitation amounts are linked to those of 
the LLMC Convention.72 Hence, the only difference the Bunkers Convention will make 
in Norwegian legislation is to oblige the shipowner to maintain compulsory insurance 
cover and secure the claimants right to direct action against the P&I Clubs. 
 
Opinions are divided as to when, and indeed if, these conventions will come into force, 
given the amplitude of the political disagreement they are subject to. A step in the right 
direction is, however, the European Union’s formal approval of the Member states’ 
intention to ratify the HNS and Bunker Oil Conventions by 30 June 2006.73 If that 
happens, and the necessary number of states representing the required number of cargo 
interest is thereby fulfilled, the HNS and Bunker Oil Conventions will enter into force 
18 months and 1 year after this respectively.  
3.3.2 Limitation provisions 
The coastal state may, however, find itself exposed financially even when the damage 
falls within the scope of the CLC and Fund Conventions. This is the case where the 
damages following an accident exceed the limits of compensation available under these 
regimes.  
 
 
 
69 Bunker Oil Convention article 14 (1) 
70 Jamaica, Samoa, Slovenia, Spain and Tonga (as at 30 August 2004) 
71 NMC section 208 third paragraph 
72 Article 6 ”Nothing in this Convention shall affect the right of the shipowner and the person or persons 
providing insurance or other financial security to limit liability under any applicable national or 
international regime, such as the Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, 1976, as 
amended.” 
73 Council decision 2002/762/EC 
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The insufficiency of the compensation was made evident by the Prestige accident. The 
compensation from the ship owner under the Civil Liability regime is limited according 
to the gross tonnage of the vessel. Under the 1992 Protocol that applied in the case of 
Prestige, the compensation for vessels with a gross tonnage of between 5.000 and 
140.000 tons was 3 million special drawing rights (SDR) plus 420 SDR for each 
additional unit of tonnage over 5000.74 The gross tonnage of Prestige was 42,820 tons. 
The compensation available from the shipowner was thus approximately 16 million 
SDR, which equals about 22 million euros.  The compensation from the Fund is not 
dependent on the size of the ship, but is limited to a maximum amount per incident. The 
Prestige was subject to the 1992 Fund Protocol, under which the maximum 
compensation available was 135 million SDR, or approximately 175 million euros. This 
maximum amount includes the sum paid by the shipowner or his insurer under the 1992 
Civil Liability Protocol.75
 
This amount stands in stark contrast to the claims submitted in the wake of the accident. 
As at 5 November 2004, claims totalling 676 million euros have been presented in 
Spain. In France, claims totalling 89 million euros have so far been received. In 
addition, the Portuguese government has submitted a claim for 3.3 million euros for 
clean up and preventive measures.76 The total amount of the claim is, however, 
expected to rise as the Fund has estimated the total losses to exceed 1 billion euros.77
 
As a direct consequence of the accidents involving Erika and Prestige, the IMO decided 
to raise the compensation available under the Civil Liability and Fund regimes by 50 %. 
The new limits entered into force on 1 November 2003, as the “2000 Amendments” to 
the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions.  As illustrated by the Prestige incident, this 
increment is not sufficient to close the gap between the compensation available and 
losses incurred after large oil spills. Subsequently, the IMO adopted a Protocol to the 
 
 
74 IOPC Fund 1992 Claims Manual of November 2002 p. 8 
75 IOPC Fund 1992 Claims Manual of November 2002 p. 10  
76 Updated claim figures are available at www.iopcfund.org/prestige.htm 
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conventions in May 2003, for the establishment of a Supplementary Fund, which raises 
the maximum compensation available under the Civil Liability and Fund Regimes to 
750 million SDR, or approximately 1 billion euros. So far, six states, which received a 
total amount of 392 million tons of oil last calendar year, have ratified the Protocol.78 
The EU states have undertaken to ratify the Protocol “within a reasonable time, and if 
possible, before 30 June 2004”.79 The Protocol will enter into force three months after it 
has been ratified by at least eight states which have received a combined total of 450 
million tons of contributing oil in a calendar year. This is likely to be fulfilled by early 
2005.80 
 
The entry into force of the Supplementary Fund will do away with much of the existing 
gap between compensation and loss. In the meantime, the problem has been sought 
avoided by coastal states through the demanding of financial security as a condition for 
granting entry. This was the case with the Long Lin,81 which was denied entry to Dutch 
waters following the insurers’ refusal to grant a guarantee that exceeded the amounts to 
which they had right to limit liability. Demand for financial guarantees exceeding the 
compensation limits under the liability conventions constitutes a breach of the 
international obligations of party states. The practice thereby undermines the 
international compensation regimes. This development is unfortunate, because lack of 
uniformity may lead to increased strain on states that play by the rules.82
 
Insufficient compensation as a result of the right to limit liability is not really a gap in 
the compensation regime, as the amounts of compensation are limited intentionally. 
 
 
77 Note by the IOPC Fund Director, “Prestige – Estimate of the cost of the incident and level of 
payments”, 11 February 2004 
78 Denmark, Norway, Finland, France, Ireland, and Japan (as of 14 September 2004).  Updated number of 
ratifications is available at www.iopcfund.org/news.htm#supfund 
79 Council decision 2004/246/EC 
80 IOPC Fund at www.iopcfund.org/news.htm#supfund 
81 Cf. account above  
82 So called “place of refuge shopping” may also arise as a result of states being party to different 
Protocols to liability conventions, see Ringbom, p. 149 
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Nevertheless, unsatisfactory compensation may lead victims of environmental damage 
to look to hold others, like the coastal state, liable for the damage.  
3.3.3 Exceptions to the shipowner’s liability 
Under the Civil Liability and Fund regime the shipowner may be exonerated wholly or 
partially from his liability vis-à-vis claimants that have wilfully or negligently 
contributed to the damage, cf. NMC section 192 second paragraph, which incorporates 
CLC Convention article III (3) and Fund Convention article 4 (3). Similar provisions 
are found in article 7 (3) of the HNS Convention and article 3 (3) of the Bunker Oil 
Convention. The exoneration of the shipowner is in recognition of contributory 
negligence on part of the claimant.   
 
An example of exoneration of the shipowner on the grounds of public authorities’ 
contributory negligence for oil pollution damage is provided by the incident involving 
the Agean Sea.83 The vessel, which was carrying 80.000 tons of crude oil, ran aground 
while approaching the harbour in La Coruña, Spain in December 1992. In the 
subsequent proceedings before the Coruña Court of Appeal, the blame for the grounding 
of the vessel was held by the court to be divided between the master of the ship and the 
state-employed pilot responsible for guiding the vessel to shore. The shipowner was 
thus exonerated for 50 % of the established claim forwarded by Spain.  
3.3.3.1 Contributory negligence  
It seems clear from the case of the Agean Sea that exoneration may take place vis-à-vis 
public authorities. The question remains however, whether the shipowner may be 
exonerated for liability vis-à-vis the coastal state if the decision to grant or refuse refuge 
has negligently contributed to the damage. There seems to be nothing in the convention 
to prevent exoneration at the sacrifice of the coastal state as such, given that it has acted 
negligently. Negligence may arise both from admittance and refusal to admit a vessel in 
distress. The authorities may act negligently in granting access, by ordering the vessel 
into a place of refuge that is too shallow or otherwise unsuitable. Negligence may also 
 
 
83 The summary of the incident is based on that of De la Rue, p. 93-94 
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arise from the latter situation, where a vessel is ordered out and consequently breaks in 
two and causes pollution. Both these situations raise difficult questions of causation. 
The causation issue was discussed in the Agean Sea case, where shared responsibility 
was established on the grounds that the incident would have been avoided if either of 
them had acted with proper care. Matters are, however, complicated when a vessel is 
causing pollution at the time of the negligent act by the injured party. This was the case 
with the Prestige, which was leaking oil before the request for refuge was made. The 
granting of refuge would almost surely have resulted in some pollution due to the 
already incurred damage. When the vessel was ordered out to sea, where it caused 
further pollution, it is difficult to establish which part resulted from the original damage 
and which part that was a consequence of the decision to order the ship to sea. Whether 
public authorities’ decision to grant or refuse access to a place of refuge may constitute 
contributory negligence will be discussed further below. 
 
An important difference between the CLC and Fund Conventions with regard to 
exoneration of the shipowner because of acts or omissions by the claimant is that there 
is no exoneration of the Fund with regard to preventive measures.84 This has not been 
reflected in the Norwegian law provision that incorporates the CLC and Fund 
Conventions.85 The relevant provision merely states that the liability can be abated 
where the injured party has wilfully or negligently contributed to the damage. The issue 
for consideration is whether Norwegian authorities can avoid exoneration of the Fund 
by claiming that the place of refuge decision was a preventive measure. This is a 
question about the relationship between national and international law. Norwegian law 
is presumed to correspond to international law. The principle of presumption secures 
that the content of international law is not lost through translation.86 Where, like here, 
there is no indication that the difference is intentional, Norwegian law must be 
considered to have the same content as the conventions it is based on. If the decision to 
grant or refuse access is found to fall within the category of “preventive measures”, the 
 
 
84 Fund Convention article 4 (3)  
85 NMC section 192 
86 Ruud II, p. 42-42 
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Norwegian authorities will therefore have access to the Fund for recovering its expenses 
even where it is found to have acted negligently.  
3.3.3.2 Preventive measures 
According to the Fund Convention article 1 (2) cf. CLC Convention article 1 (7), 
preventive measures are “any reasonable measures taken by any person after an incident 
has occurred to prevent or minimize pollution damage”. This definition provides three 
main criteria for falling within the scope of “preventive measures”. First of all, the 
measure has to be reasonable. Secondly, the object of the measure must have been to 
prevent or minimize pollution damage. Finally, the definition is limited to measures 
taken after the occurrence of an incident.  
 
The notion of “preventive measures” is elaborates in detail in a technical paper 
submitted by the International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation Limited to the 7th 
Intercessional Working group of the 1971 IOPC Fund.87 According to the paper, a 
“preventive measure” must pass a “test of reasonableness”, which prescribes that the 
measure, in light of the technical appraisal at the time the decision was made, must have 
been likely to succeed in minimizing pollution damage. That the measure proves to be 
ineffective or even counterproductive with regard to minimizing pollution does not in 
itself make it unreasonable. The decisive criterion for passing the test of reasonableness 
is thus that the decision to grant or refuse refuge, in light of the information available at 
the time of its implementation, appears likely to minimize damage. The problem in 
place of refuge situations is that pollution will often result in either case. In order to pass 
the test of reasonableness, the decision should be made according to which of the two 
alternatives are best suited to minimize pollution damage. Evidently, this is not easy. 
One must, however, build on the experience provided by actual events. The Erika and 
the Prestige have shown that the environmental problems do not go away by ordering 
the vessel out to sea. There is reason to underline the particular problems connected 
with oil pollution in this regard. Because oil does not easily dissolve in water, spills on 
 
 
87 Criteria for the admissibility of claims for Compensation: 1. Compensation and Property damage, 
appendix 13/1 in De la Rue, p. 1185 et seq. 
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the high sea will in many cases affect the coast. This may less frequently be the case 
with other substances, which may evaporate from the sea surface relatively quickly.  
 
Another source of interpretation is the IOPC Fund Claims manual.88 With respect to the 
second criterion, this states that the measure must have as its primary purpose to 
minimize pollution damage to be labelled preventive.89 In a place of refuge context, one 
might argue that where a decision on whether or not to grant refuge is motivated by 
political interests, for instance the coastal state’s strained relationship with the vessel’s 
flag state, it is not a preventive measure. Where the decision is based on such ulterior 
considerations, there is no reason to grant it immunity. 
 
In accordance with the third criteria, only measures that are taken after the occurrence 
of an “incident” are considered preventive with regard to the CLC and Fund 
Conventions. The term “incident” is defined in CLC article I (8) as “any occurrence, or 
a series of occurrences having the same origin, which causes pollution damage or 
creates an imminent threat of causing such damage.” The requirement is to secure that 
only measures that are necessary are given immunity. In a place of refuge context, this 
is not likely to cause problems in relation to vessels that suffer from structural damage 
at the time of requesting refuge. Where the incident has not yet resulted in pollution 
damage, an evaluation of the nature and risks of the distress becomes necessary.90 An 
oil tanker that suffers from engine failure is in distress, but the extent to which its 
situation causes imminent threat of pollution damage, will depend on how far the vessel 
is from the coast, weather conditions and so on. An instructive example is provided by 
the incident involving the Russian oil tanker Moscow outside the coast of the North 
Cape in June 2003.91 The vessel, which was laden with 102.000 tons of crude oil, 
suffered engine failure at 19 nautical miles off the coast and started to drift towards 
land. Because the coast in the area is rocky, there was a large risk of the vessel running 
 
 
88 An online version is available at www.iopcfund.org/npdf/92claim.pdf 
89 IOPC Fund 1992 Claims Manual p. 19 
90 Ringbom, p. 154, footnote 33 
91 Summary of events based on article in Aftenposten “Oljetransport til besvær” 
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aground as it approached shore. Luckily, the crew was able to start the engine before 
anything happened. The incident does, however, illustrate that even a vessel in perfect 
structural shape may represent an imminent threat of pollution.  
 
The incident also revealed a serious gap in Norwegian oil pollution emergency response when it became 
clear that the nearest tug that had capacity to handle a vessel of this size was 10 hours away, as it has not 
been possible to maintain commercial tug operation in the North of Norway. The authorities have since 
established public tug capacity in the area.   
 
It seems then that a decision on whether or not to grant refuge should not automatically 
be labelled a preventive measure. If the coastal state acts negligently and thereby 
increases the extent of damage, the reasonable consequence is that this is reflected in a 
reduction of the compensation. This is in consequence of the general duty to mitigate 
loss.92 This duty is clearly spelled out in the CMI guidelines on Oil Pollution Damage93 
section 1 (2) which reads: “Compensation may be refused or reduced if a claimant fails 
to take reasonable steps to avoid or mitigate any loss, damage or expense.” These 
guidelines aim to state the extent to which claims under the CLC and Fund Conventions 
are thought to be recoverable in different countries, with regard to the criteria developed 
by the IOPC Fund.94 Under Norwegian law, breach of the duty to mitigate loss is 
regarded as contributory negligence on part of the claimant, cf. the Norwegian Tort Act 
section 5-1 (2). 
 
Even if the decision to grant or refuse entry cannot be labelled a preventive measure, the 
Fund is unlikely to claim exoneration on the grounds of contributory negligence of the 
coastal state, seeing that the Fund is an intergovernmental organisation in which the 
states are represented. As pointed out in a recent article, one can, however, not expect 
the P&I Clubs to hesitate in invoking contributory negligence to the defence of the 
shipowner.95 The possibility of exoneration of the shipowner thus represents a risk for 
 
 
92 CMI guidelines on Oil Pollution Damage paragraph 1 (2) 
93 Adopted at the 1994 CMI Conference in Sydney  
94 De la Rue, p. 1179-1180 
95 Ringbom, p. 135 
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the coastal state of not being adequately compensated, which may affect its attitude 
towards admitting vessels in distress.  
 
4 Coastal state liability 
Where the damage has occurred following a controversial admittance or refusal of a 
vessel to a place of refuge, and the international compensation regimes do not apply or 
prove insufficient, claimants might look to hold the coastal state responsible. This 
chapter looks at different bases for Coastal state liability, but should by no means be 
considered to give an exhaustive account.  
4.1 Channelling of liability 
The CLC/Fund regime hold that liability for oil pollution from tankers shall be 
exclusively channelled to the registered owner, cf. Civil Liability Convention article III 
(4), which is incorporated in Norwegian law through NMC section 193 (2). The same 
applies to oil pollution from other vessels, cf. NMC Section 208, despite the fact that 
the Bunkers Convention has not yet entered into force.96 A similar channelling 
provision is found in the HNS Convention Article 7 (5).97
 
The channelling of liability to the shipowner implies that liability cannot be invoked 
against the parties protected under this provision, among them any person taking 
preventive measures.98 To what extent a decision on whether or not to admit a vessel to 
a place of refuge qualifies as a preventive measure is discussed above. If the coastal 
state’s decision to grant or refuse refuge is considered a preventive measure, it may only 
 
 
96 The Bunkers Convention secures channelling of liability to the shipowner in Article 3. Contrary to the 
other framework conventions, the shipowner is not always the registered owner, but may also be the 
bareboat charterer, the manager or the operator of the vessel, cf. Bunkers Convention Article 2 
97 While this convention is not in force, the liability is directly regulated in the Pollution Act, which 
channels liability to the operator, cf. POA section 55 first paragraph 
98 NMC section 193 (2) litra e) 
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be sued for liability when the damage resulted from their personal act or omission 
committed with the intent to cause such damage or from gross negligence and with 
knowledge that such damage would probably result, cf. NMC 193, second paragraph.99 
This is not likely to occur, because where the decision to grant or refuse access is taken 
with intention of causing damage or in gross negligence with knowledge that such 
damage would probably result, it cannot be regarded a preventive measure. The test of 
reasonableness with regard to preventive measures fails long before one enters the stage 
of gross negligence with knowledge that damage would probably occur, let alone where 
there is intent to cause damage. 
 
CLC Article III (5) establishes that “Nothing in this Convention shall prejudice any right of recourse of 
the owner against third parties”, including the protected parties under CLC Article III (4). In the 
corresponding provision in NMC section 193, third paragraph, the owner is prevented from seeking 
recourse against most of the protected parties, among them any person taking preventive measures, unless 
they have acted with intent to cause damage or in gross negligence with knowledge that such damage 
would result. Norwegian law thus prescribes a more far-reaching channelling of liability than the CLC 
Convention.100
 
Where the decision to grant or refuse refuge is not considered a preventive measure, the 
coastal state may be held liable outside the Framework conventions. To what extent the 
coastal state can be held liable for pollution damage following a place of refuge 
decision, relies on national legislation. As pointed out above discussed above, chapter 8 
of the Pollution Act supplies the NMC with regard to pollution from ships insofar as the 
question of liability is not separately regulated by other legislation or a contract, cf. 
POA section 53 fourth paragraph cf. first paragraph. The question of coastal state 
liability for pollution from vessels will therefore have to be considered on the basis of 
the Pollution Act.  
 
 
99 The corresponding provision in CLC Article III (4) uses the term “recklessly” rather than “gross 
negligence”. The difference does not appear to be intentional, and does in my opinion make little 
difference, as the decisive factor lies in the formulation “with knowledge that such damage would 
probably result”, which raises the threshold both in relation to recklessness and gross negligence. 
100 The preparatory works to the NMC assume that the convention does not prevent this, cf. Ot.prp.nr.21 
(1994-1995) p. 13-14 
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4.2 Liability under the Pollution Act 
POA Section 55 (1) imposes strict, unlimited liability on the operator of the activity that 
causes the environmental damage; “The owner of real property, an object, an 
installation or an enterprise that causes pollution damage is liable to pay compensation 
pursuant to this chapter regardless of any fault on his part if the owner also operates, 
uses or occupies the property, etc.” In shipping, this will normally be the registered 
owner of the vessel.101 The shipowner’s right to limit liability in accordance with the 
LLMC Convention may, however, result in a situation in which the compensation from 
the shipowner is not sufficient to cover all claims. As a consequence, injured parties 
may seek to hold others, among them the coastal state, responsible. 
 
4.2.1 Liability under POA section 55 second paragraph 
Under POA section 55 the channelling of liability to the owner or operator is not 
absolute. So called indirect tort feasors can be held liable for contributory negligence in 
accordance with POA section 55 second paragraph:  
 
“Any person that by supplying goods and services, carrying out control or supervisory 
measures or similar means has indirectly contributed to pollution damage is liable only 
if he has done so intentionally or negligently. In evaluating fault, it shall be taken into 
account whether the claims the injured party may reasonably make in regard to the 
activity or service have been disregarded. , however, this provision does not in any way 
restrict the liability that follows from the compensation rules otherwise applicable.”  
 
The issue to be considered here is whether the authorities can be held liable under this 
provision for pollution damage stemming from the decision to grant or refuse refuge. 
Under section 55 second paragraph, the contributory negligence may consist in 
“supplying goods and services, carrying out control or supervisory measures or similar 
means”. The preparatory works to the pollution act specifically state that public 
 
 
101 Falkanger II, p. 155 et seq. 
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authorities may be held liable under section 55 second paragraph, for instance where the 
pollution control authorities give orders that result in environmental damage.102  
  
In deciding whether fault has been exercised, one must evaluate whether reasonable 
claims of the injured party have been neglected. The standard does not refer to 
legitimate concrete expectations of the injured parties in particular cases, but rather to 
what is proper procedure in different circumstances.103 The wording corresponds to that 
of the Norwegian Tort Act104 section 2-1, which was formulated with particular regard 
to the liability of public authorities.105 The legal basis of this provision is of great 
relevance to the interpretation of POA section 55 second paragraph.106 The preparatory 
works to the Tort Act state that the threshold for establishing liability should be higher 
with regard to public control and service activities than other activities.107 This is also 
evident in Norwegian case law concerning liability for public services; cf. the Tiranna 
judgment,108 which is also referred to in the preparatory works to the Pollution Act 
section 55 second paragraph.109 The decision concerned the requirements of due care in 
relation to public services. The tribunal held that with regard to liability for public 
services, the tortious act must constitute a “significant deviation” from what is 
considered proper procedure in the given circumstances.110  Recent years has seen a 
development in favour of lowering the threshold for establishing fault liability of public 
authorities, cf. the judgments of Furunculous111 and the Selbu Lake.112 These judgments 
recognise that a less stringent requirement of de care applies to public service activities, 
 
 
102 NOU 1982:19 p. 55-57 and 250 
103 Falkanger II, p. 158-159 
104 Tort Act of 13 June 1969 no. 26 
105 Ot. Prp. Nr. 33 (1988-89) p. 108 and Lødrup, p. 181 
106 Bugge, p. 278 
107 Ot. Prp. Nr. 48 (1965-66) p. 59 et seq. and Hagstrøm, p. 389-390 cf. Ot. Prp. Nr. 48 (1965-66) p.57 
108 Rt. 1970 p. 1154 
109 NOU 1982:19 p. 55-57 
110 Rt. 1970 p. 1154 
111 Rt. 1992 p. 453 
112 Rt. 1999 p. 1517 
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but that the same cannot be said for public control functions.113 As mentioned above, 
the decision to grant or refuse access to a place of refuge is part of public emergency 
response to pollution. The main purpose of the activity is thus not to assist the vessel in 
distress, but to control and prevent acute pollution. Since the Tiranna judgment was 
referred to in the preparatory works of the Pollution Act in 1982, there has moreover 
been a huge development in environmental law, towards stricter liability. In light of this 
development and current case law, it is therefore unlikely that the norm established in 
this case can be relied on in the assessment of public authorities’ contributory 
negligence in a place of refuge decision.114 The assessment of public authorities’ 
contributory negligence according to POA section 55, second paragraph, is thus subject 
to normal requirements of due care. 
4.2.2 Proper procedure  
As discussed in chapter 2, the Coastal Administration’s Department for Emergency 
Response (DER) has established a procedure for decision-making in place of refuge 
situations (the DER procedure). In assessing whether requirements of due care have 
been neglected, such written rules of conduct are of particular significance.115 Where, 
like here, the rules of conduct aim at preventing the damage caused by the breach, this 
may constitute “negligence per se”.116  
 
The decision on whether or not to grant or refuse access to a place of refuge involves exercise of statutory 
power. A condition for invoking liability for such decisions is that the exercise of statutory power is 
wrongful.117 Wrongfulness arises from breaches of the rules of proper conduct that applies in different 
circumstances.118 The assessment of wrongfulness thus coincides with assessment of fault.119 In addition 
to the requirements laid down in the DER procedure, the assessment of due care will therefore be 
 
 
113 Rt. 1992 p. 453, on p. 478-479, Rt. 1999 p. 1517, on p. 1529-1530 and Lødrup, p. 191 
114 For further reading see Lødrup, p. 186-193, Bugge, p. 278-279 and Hagstrøm p. 385 et seq. 
115 Hagstrøm, p. 272 et seq. 
116 Lødrup, p. 131 
117 Graver, p. 507-508 and Rt. 1992 p. 453 on p. 476 
118 Graver, p. 509 
119 Wrongfulness is also used in the assessment of fault, cf. Lødrup p. 160-162 
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supplied by general rules of proper conduct in public administration.120 Some of these are laid down in 
the Administrative Procedure Act,121 while others are non statutory principles of Norwegian 
administrative law. 
 
The DER procedure holds that the decision on whether or not to grant refuge should be 
taken by considering different factors and risks identified in the following in 
cooperation with the other parties involved in the situation.122  
 
Aspects relating to the vessel To be discussed with 
The seaworthiness of the vessel Crew, person responsible at the scene of 
the incident, the Coastal Directorate, 
salvage company 
The vessel’s cargo and bunkers 
(particularly HNS cargo) 
Crew, shipowners, the Coastal Directorate 
The intentions and recommendations of 
the Master, shipowner and salvors 
Salvors, the Coastal Directorate 
The possibility to enact damage reducing 
measures before the vessel is transported 
to a place of refuge 
Crew, shipowners, the Coastal Directorate, 
person responsible at the scene of the 
incident 
The vessel’s position in relation to the 
most suitable place of refuge  
Pilot, control centre, person responsible at 
the scene of the incident 
The ownership and insurance situation of 
the vessel 
Master, shipowner, insurers, the Coastal 
Directorate 
Salvage contracts Master, shipowner, insurer, salvage 
company 
Aspects relating to the place of refuge To be discussed with 
Safety of human beings en route to and at The Coastal Directorate, the Directorate for 
                                                 
 
120 For a detailed presentation of the contents of these rules, see Eckhoff, p. 423 et seq. 
121 Act relating to procedure in cases concerning the public administration of 10 February 1967 
122 The table gives a translated version of annex 3 to the DER procedure 
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the place of refuge Civil Protection and Emergency Planning, 
Consultation in accidents involving 
chemicals, the Centre for information on 
poisonous substances  
Different needs relating to the size of the 
vessel (for example 100.000 dwt 
minimum 1000 m diameter) 
 
The risk of pollution Crew, person responsible at the scene of 
the incident and/or the Coastal Directorate  
The vulnerability of the area in proximity 
of the place of refuge 
The County administrator 
Alternative shelter en route to the place of 
refuge 
Pilot, control centre 
Preparation for entry to a place of refuge; 
calculations and consequences 
Salvage Company, expert opinion within 
the Coastal Administration, for instance 
Global Maritime in Stavanger 
Other problems or consequences of 
granting a place of refuge 
Port authorities, municipal government 
At the place of refuge: Works to be 
carried out, infrastructure with regard to 
emergency unloading of the cargo and 
other reparations 
Port authorities, municipal government 
Aspects relating to physical conditions To be discussed with 
Weather, sea, current, tide and wind 
conditions 
Pilot, control centre 
Navigation conditions: Possibility of 
anchoring, space to manoeuvre, depth and 
base conditions etc. 
Pilot, control centre 
 
Failure to take into account some or all of the factors referred to above is a breach of the 
DER procedure, which in itself may constitute negligence. Moreover, the aim of such 
written rules of conduct is to secure correct exercise of administrative discretion. Failure 
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to assess the various factors may therefore constitute wrongful exercise of 
administrative discretion. In order to establish liability on the basis of negligence, there 
must be causation between the breach and the damage. This is the case where the DER 
for instance has failed to take into consideration the size of the vessel and subsequently 
directs it to a place of refuge where the water is too shallow, causing the vessel to run 
aground and cause pollution.  
 
Although the factors in the DER procedure might not give an exhaustive account of the 
concerns that should be attached weight in a place of refuge situation, the taking into 
account of ulterior considerations may constitute wrongful exercise of administrative 
discretion. An ulterior consideration in this respect would for instance be that refuge 
was refused because the shipping company had previously failed to pay for rescue 
services supplied by the Coastal Administration. In order to establish liability on part of 
the authorities on this basis, here must be causation between the taking of ulterior 
considerations and the damage caused.  
 
The DER procedure moreover holds that the DER shall consult with the parties 
involved in the place of refuge situation before reaching a decision. Failure to do so may 
lead to breaches of the rules of the general rules of proper conduct in public 
administration. The Administrative Procedure Act section 17 obliges public authorities 
to ensure that a case is sufficiently scrutinised before a decision is reached, and failure 
to fulfil this duty is a breach of proper procedure. In order to establish liability, the 
breach of proper procedure must have caused the damage. Was a decision for instance 
to be taken without proper consultation with the crew or others competent of assessing 
the condition of the vessel, the DER could be ignorant of the risks involved in ordering 
the vessel out to sea. If damage is caused as a result of the negligent ignorance on part 
of the DER, they may be held liable. 
 
The decisions may also suffer from lack of impartiality on part of the decision maker, 
which is breach of the general rules of proper conduct in public administration. The 
requirements as to impartiality are listed in the Administrative Procedure Act section 6, 
after which a Public Official shall be disqualified where he or she has personal 
connections to the case or the parties to the case, or where other special circumstances 
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are apt to impair confidence in his or her impartiality. In a place of refuge situation, 
disqualification may result where the decision maker has economic interests in the 
shipping company that owns the distressed vessel or where he or she lives in the 
community that is exposed to the risk of environmental damage posed by the ship.  
 
The DER procedure further prescribes that the competent decision maker is the DER 
director. If the decision is taken by another administrative body, this may constitute lack 
of personal competence. This is nearly always the case when the decision is taken by an 
administrative body that is a subordinate or a co-ordinate to the competent body, while a 
superior administrative body that has power of instruction over the competent body can 
normally make the decision without this constituting lack of personal competence.123  
This being said, there seems to be an exception when the authority to make the decision 
is deliberately placed with a subordinate body because of its particular qualifications on 
the subject.124 The DER is a professionally specialised administrative body. Although it 
is ultimately subject to the instruction of the Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs, it 
is organised and staffed as a politically independent unit. Its director is presumed to 
have a good understanding of the refuge situation which should make him or her 
particularly capable of reaching a well balanced decision. The relative objectivity of the 
DER director makes him or her particularly suited to handle potentially difficult 
political decisions in a balanced manner. There is hence reason to believe that the 
authority to grant and refuse entry is meant to rest solely with the DER.  
 
Similar efforts to depoliticize the place of refuge question have also been made in the United Kingdom, 
where the responsibility lies with a Secretary of state’s Representative for Maritime Salvage and 
Intervention (SOSREP), who is “free to act without recourse to higher authority.”125  
 
In order to establish liability on this basis, there must be causation between the lack of 
personal competence and the damage caused. Damage may for instance arise where the 
decision maker does not possess the knowledge required for assessing the situation. If 
 
 
123 Eckhoff, p. 427 
124 Eckhoff, p. 124-125 
125 Maritime and Coastguard Agency, “The role of the SOSREP” 
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the decision maker is not familiar with salvage law, he or she may be ignorant to the 
“no cure – no pay” principle, which may colour the salvors’ assessment of the risks 
involved in bringing a vessel into a place of refuge.126  
 
The discussion above merely aims at presenting examples from which liability may 
arise. Liability under POA section 55, second paragraph, is dependent on the exercise of 
fault. In assessing the fault, one must evaluate if there has been a breach of proper 
procedure. Proper procedure in a place of refuge situation is prescribed both by specific 
written rules of conduct in the form of the DER procedure and general rules of conduct 
in public administration. Breach of proper procedure may constitute negligence in itself. 
In this sense, the assessment of liability for place of refuge decisions bears resemblance 
to strict liability.      
 
Legal theorists are divided in the view of whether public authorities are strictly liable for invalid 
administrative decisions.127 The distinction makes little difference in reality, because strict liability 
depends on wrongful exercise of statutory power, which may also constitute negligence. Further 
discussion goes beyond the scope of this thesis.128   
 
If the DER is found to have acted negligently, the Norwegian state will be liable in 
accordance with vicarious liability under section 2-1 of the Tort Act, unless the damage 
was caused by an act or omission by the employee which goes beyond what can 
reasonably be expected with regard to the activity in question.129
 
The Pollution Act concerns liability for pollution damage that occurs a) In Norway or 
the Exclusive Economic Zone of Norway, or b) outside these areas if the damage is 
caused by an incident or activity within Norwegian Sea or land territory.130 Where the 
admission or refusal of a vessel in distress has caused transboundary pollution, there is 
 
 
126 Shaw, p. 341 
127 Lødrup, p. 192  
128 The subject is discussed in depth by Echoff, p. 449, Graver, p. 508 and Hagstrøm, p. 53 et seq. 
129 Further discussion goes beyond the scope of this thesis, but can be found in Lødrup, p. 183-186 
130 POA section 54 
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thus nothing to prevent foreign claimants to seek compensation by holding Norwegian 
authorities liable in Norwegian courts.131 The Pollution Act thus provides a basis for 
liability vis-à-vis transboundary claimants.132    
4.3 Liability for environmental damage under international law 
In chapter 2 of this thesis I discussed the obligations imposed on coastal states by 
international environmental law. The issue to be considered here is if and to what extent 
coastal states may be held liable under international law for environmental damage 
arising from a place of refuge situation. 
4.3.1 Inter state liability 
UNCLOS establishes an obligation to prevent harm to other states’ territory and to the 
area beyond any state’s territory. As we have seen in chapter 2, the place of refuge 
situation may conflict with these obligations. The question is to what extent the coastal 
state can be held liable for such infringements. The basis for such liability under 
UNCLOS is Article 235 (1): “states are responsible for the fulfilment of their 
international obligations concerning the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment. They shall be liable in accordance with international law.”  
 
This provision establishes inter state liability for breach of environmental obligation. 
This means that if Norway through the admittance or refusal of a vessel to a place of 
refuge has failed to fulfil its obligation not to cause damage to the territory of Sweden, 
the latter may invoke liability through legal action. States are liable “in accordance with 
international law.”  
 
This leaves open the question of whether liability is dependent on fault or not.133 The distinction between 
strict and fault liability for breach of international obligations makes little difference in reality, as the 
 
 
131 See the case of Saugbrugsforeningen, Rt. 1992 p. 1612, where a Swedish environmentalist 
organisation was found to have the same right to sue as Norwegian claimants under the Pollution Act 
section 54 (1) b). The ordinary requirements for legal interest and capacity must obviously be fulfilled, cf. 
Hov, chapter 7 II and 8 II and III 
132 The Pollution Act thus fulfils Norway’s obligation under UNCLOS article 235 (2), which will be 
discussed below 
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main criteria is that the state has committed a wrongful act. The point is that wrongfulness may also 
constitute fault, cf. the position under Norwegian administrative law described above. Further discussion 
of this goes beyond the scope of this thesis.134  
 
Disputes concerning alleged breaches of environmental obligations are subject to 
mandatory procedures in accordance with UNCLOS Part XV Section 2, cf. UNCLOS 
Article 297 (1) c). Under this section, states have on beforehand decided to resolve 
disputes at by one of the following means; The International Tribunal on the Law Of the 
Sea (ITLOS), the ICJ or an arbitral tribunal, cf. UNCLOS article 287. Such legal actions 
are, however, seldom taken by states. This does not mean that breaches of 
environmental duties do not occur. It may be reasonable to presume that the other states 
affected by the Prestige accident would have a good case against Spain under 
international law. Yet, reluctance to take legal action persists due to the fact that the 
affected states often have similar interests as the state guilty of infringement. In the case 
of the Prestige, the affected states were all other coastal states, which may find 
themselves in a similar position in the future.  
 
The starting point is that international law regulates affairs between states, and that 
individuals cannot act as legal subjects. Individuals are thus prevented from appearing 
as parties before international bodies of dispute settlement. This does not mean, 
however, that individuals do not have rights under international law, since the home 
state may act as plaintiff on their behalf. This was done by Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines in the Saiga case before the ITLOS.135  
 
The individuals’ dependency on their home state does, however, put important 
limitations on the efficiency of UNCLOS, as it prevents individuals from invoking their 
rights where the home state is not willing to act on their behalf. In situations where 
individuals in one state accuse another state of infringement of their rights under 
 
 
133 Nordquist, p. 412 
134 For in depth discussion on this issue see Cassese, p. 187 et seq.  
135 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea 
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international law, the home state may be reluctant to act because of fear of affecting the 
political relationship between the states.  
 
The position of individuals is sought improved by placing upon the states an obligation 
to provide compensation for pollution damage in their national jurisdictions. The duty is 
established in the second paragraph of UNCLOS Article 235: “states shall ensure that 
recourse is available in accordance with their legal system for prompt and adequate 
compensation or other relief in respect of damage caused by pollution of the marine 
environment by natural or juridical persons under their jurisdiction.” Where the duty is 
fulfilled, individuals may seek compensation for pollution damage in accordance with 
municipal law. The extent to which public authorities can be held liable depends on 
domestic law. We have seen above that public authorities may be held liable for 
pollution damage under Norwegian law. One should , however, underline that 
Norwegian law represents a more radical approach in this respect than many other 
legislations, where the dominant view is that “the King can do no wrong”.136 Some 
interpret Article 235 (2) to mean that if a state has not fulfilled its duty to secure that 
recourse is available under municipal law, it may be liable for acts or omissions of 
persons under its jurisdiction itself.137 If so is the case, such liability can only be 
invoked by other states. 
4.3.2 Liability vis-à-vis individuals 
As discussed in chapter 2, human rights may provide legal basis for a duty to prevent 
harm to the state’s own territory. If individuals had to depend on the home state to act as 
plaintiff on their behalf in these circumstances, it would prove very ineffective, as states 
are unlikely to raise the matter where it is accused of breach by its own citizens. Recent 
years have seen a development in favour of increased right for individuals to petition 
international bodies, especially when it comes to human rights. Individuals’ right of 
access to court is for instance specifically provided for in ECHR article 34.138 Where 
 
 
136 Lødrup, p. 186-187, Hagstrøm, p. 468 
137 Hetherington I, p. 373 
138 Subject to exhaustion of local remedies, cf. Møse, p. 125  
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pollution caused by granting or refusing a place of refuge is found to violate the rights 
under the ECHR, the coastal state may be liable to provide just satisfaction under 
Article 41: “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the 
protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows 
only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction 
to the injured party.”  
 
The ECHR places upon the states an obligation to “secure to everyone within their 
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.”139 This 
does not mean that the state’s responsibility is restricted to its own citizens; cf. the quote 
from the ECtHR which affirmed that “the responsibility of Contracting states can be 
involved by acts and omissions of their authorities which produce effects outside their 
own territory.”140   Where the admittance or refusal of the vessel by Norwegian 
authorities causes damage that violates the human rights of transboundary claimants 
these may hence invoke liability.141
 
Moreover, individuals may invoke breaches of fundamental human rights regardless of 
whether or not this is provided for by specific treaty provisions.142 This recognises that 
the breach of such rights constitutes a violation against the individual itself.143 For 
instance, exposure to environmental damage may be a violation of the right to a healthy 
environment. The right is thought to form part of so called third generation human 
rights, but this is not confirmed by any specific treaty provision.144 This being said, the 
concept of fundamental rights should not be extended too far, as it may lead to a 
devaluation of human rights in general. The right to a healthy environment should hence 
not be recognised as a fundamental right in itself. If on the other hand the taking in of a 
vessel to a place of refuge leads to a chemical leakage that may be prejudicial to the 
 
 
139 ECHR article 1 
140 Turkey v. Cyprus 
141 Birnie, p. 265 
142 Fleicher, p. 322 
143 Fleicher, p. 322 
144 Birnie, p. 254 
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safety of the local community, this may constitute a violation of the right to life, which 
must be said to form part of such fundamental rights.145
5 The way ahead 
Chapter 2 concluded that the rights and obligations of coastal states in place of refuge 
situations are not clear. Since the issue was first put on the agenda by the IMO agenda 
in 2001 following the Erika and Castor incidents, numerous suggestions have emerged 
as to how this problem should be addressed. A concrete result of this work is the IMO 
guidelines on Places of Refuge, which were adopted in 2003. The problem is that the 
guidelines are not legally binding. A suggestion that would solve this problem is to 
implement the guidelines in a legally binding treaty.146 Critics of this approach argue 
that the balance of interest theory reflected in the IMO guidelines is problematic 
because it leaves the final decision to the coastal state, while it is also party to the case. 
The argument is that the double role of the coastal state makes it incapable of balancing 
its own interests and the interests of the vessel in a just manner.147 This critique may be 
justified, but the alternative suggestions reveal that the balance of interest theory may be 
the only feasible option. States would most certainly not accept that the decision was to 
be taken by a supranational body. A solution to the lack of impartiality could be to place 
the authority with a national decision-making body, which possesses the required 
neutrality and expertise. Steps in this direction have been taken in Norway and the 
United Kingdom.148  
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Others argue that the IMO guidelines need to be revised to clarify that the coastal state 
is not free to decide whether or not to grant access in a given situation.149 In order to 
serve as part of international regulation, the guidelines have, in my opinion, to be 
amended to include a measure for when refuge is to be granted that gives more direction 
than the present “whenever reasonably possible.”150 An example of such measure is the 
provision in the DER procedure to the effect that refuge should be granted when this 
offers a net safety and environmental profit. The IMO guidelines should therefore 
include a provision that reads: “When faced with a request for refuge, the coastal state 
should weigh all the factors and risks in a balanced manner and give refuge where this 
gives a net safety and environmental profit.”  
 
That being said, the guidelines present a further problem which is that of not addressing 
the liability and compensation issues that may arise from the admittance or refusal of a 
vessel to a place of refuge, cf. section 1.17. An alternative to incorporation of the IMO 
guidelines is to establish a more clearly spelled out obligation to grant refuge under 
given circumstances, which addresses the liability issues arising from the situation.151 
This could either be done by amending one of the existing conventions that touch on the 
subject to this effect or by drafting a new convention on places of refuge.152 Some legal 
theorists favour the latter approach.153 This has also been recommended by the 
European Parliament154 and in a recent report of the CMI, which was discussed at the 
IMO Legal committee meeting in late October this year.155 The suggestion met 
resistance with the International Group of P&I Clubs in a subsequent report to the Legal 
 
 
149 A suggested rephrasing of section 3.12 of the guidelines has been put forward by Velde, p. 487; 
”When permission to access a place of refuge is requested, the coastal state should weigh all the factors in 
a balanced manner and give refuge whenever reasonably possible.”  
150 Cf. IMO guidelines section 3.12 
151  A suggested phrasing is put forward by Velde, p. 491; “states are obliged to offer ships in need a place 
of refuge when this is necessary and proportionate to the damage. A state shall be liable for the damages 
caused by an unjust refusal to offer a place of refuge.” 
152 Support for the former approach is supported by Velde, p. 491-492 
153 Hooydonk I, p. 443-445, Gaskell, p. 20-21 
154 European Parliament resolution of 23 September 2003 (P5_TA(2003)0400), paragraph 38 
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committee.156 The report argues that it is too early to determine whether there is need 
for a new convention addressing the liability issues, seeing that the HNS and Fund 
Convention have not yet entered into force. The P&I clubs were originally positive to a 
new convention on places of refuge.157 The current resistance seems to be motivated in 
the realisation that such convention would inevitable lead to a raising of the limitation 
amounts under the framework conventions. The Supplementary fund is exclusively 
financed by the cargo interests. The Oil Companies International Marine Forum 
(OCIMF) has initiated a campaign to make the shipping industry take its share of the 
financial burden.  
 
The October meeting revealed that most delegations did not support the proposal for a 
new convention on places of refuge. The delegations expressed concern that the CMI 
report did not address “certain fundamental and well-established principles in the 
international liability and compensation regime”, and that the current regime “worked 
reasonably well”.158 Moreover, the delegation pointed out that the gaps in the 
compensation regimes identified in the report should be closed by the ratification and 
implementation of the dormant HNS and Bunkers conventions rather than through 
creating a new convention. The real motivation behind the states’ reluctance to a new 
convention seems to lie in fear of this leading to a more exposed position. It seems that 
the confusion surrounding the gaps in the compensation regime has defended the states 
from being exposed to liability in the past. 
 
The discussion in chapters 3 and 4 has revealed that the entry into force of the CLC and 
Bunkers Convention and the Supplementary will constitute important advances. 
Nevertheless, the coastal state will still risk not being adequately compensated and even 
being held liable itself where the decision falls outside the scope of preventive 
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measures. Some have therefore proposed further regulation in this area.159 One such 
suggestion is to include the coastal state that grants refuge among the protected parties 
under CLC Article III (4) and the correspondent provisions in the other framework 
conventions.160 This would remove the possibility of holding the coastal state liable 
where refuge is granted. But the decision to grant refuge is not always the correct one. 
Where the coastal state has chosen to bring the casualty vessel into port where this 
clearly is not likely to minimize the risk of pollution, this should have consequences for 
its legal position. 
 
It seems reasonable that immunity should not depend on whether a place of refuge is 
granted or not, but rather on whether the decision is the correct one in the given 
situation. This reasoning is reflected in the immunity of “any person taking preventive 
measures”. As long as the coastal state fulfils the requirements for preventive measures, 
it will be secure, even from exoneration of the Fund. If the coastal state fails to meet 
these criteria, this is reflected in exoneration of the shipowner and Fund and the 
possibility of holding the coastal state liable. The requirements for being labelled a 
preventive measure should work as an incentive for coastal states to take due 
considerations in their assessment of the situation, and thereby hopefully increasing the 
number of environmentally and economically sound decisions. This way the notion of 
“preventive measures” sets a standard for decision making with regard to places of 
refuge, which could preferably be presented more clearly. Taking into account the 
states’ reluctance to adopt a new convention, this could for instance be set out in a set of 
guidelines on liability and compensation corresponding to the present IMO guidelines. 
 
The last word in this case has certainly not been spoken. Recent years’ attention on the 
subject of places of refuge has , however, contributed to considerable clarification, both 
with regard to the rights and obligations of the parties involved and the liability and 
 
 
159 CMI has suggested a provision to this effect in IMO doc. LEG 89/7 
160 A suggested phrasing has been put forward by Stuart Hetherington, to secured that no claims for 
compensation can be made against “g) any state, port authority, all servants and agents and any other 
person or corporate entity granting a place of refuge to a vessel”, cf.  Hetherington II, p. 436 
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compensation issues arising thereof. One can only hope that the experience drawn from 
this work is taken into consideration by the next state faced with a potential catastrophe, 
in recognition of the plea following the Prestige accident, ¡Nunca maís! 
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